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COMMENTS
POLICE INFILTRATION OF DISSIDENT GROUPS
Next in importance to personal freedom is immun-
ity from suspicions and jealous observation. Men
may be without restraints upon their liberty; they
may pass to and fro at their pleasure; but if their
steps are tracked by spies and informers, their
words noted down for crimination, their associates
watched as conspirators-who shall say that they
are free? Nothing is more revolting to Englishmen
than the espionage which forms part of the admin-
istrative system of continental despotisms. It
haunts men like an evil genius, chills their gaiety,
restrains their wit, casts a shadow upon their
friendships, and blights their domestic hearth.
The freedom of a country may be measured by
its immunity from this baleful agency.'
Police infiltration may serve as a source of infor-
mation which is impossible to obtain in any other
way. Such investigative tactics have been tradi-
tionally used by American law enforcement
agencies to obtain information about covert crimi-
nal activity such as drug traffic and organized
crime. In recent years, the scope of activity subject
to undercover surveillance has grown ever wider.2
Dissident factions of American society now engage
in vocal and aggressive conduct demonstrating
their dissent. In response, police authorities have
adopted the practice of infiltrating dissident
groupss by employing planted informers--police
1 2 E. MAY, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY Or ENGLAND
275 (1863).2 O. W. WIISON, PoracE ADmNISTRATION 68 (1963).
For obvious reasons, it was difficult to obtain ac-
curate data from law enforcement agencies disclosing
the frequency with which police subject dissident
groups to undercover surveillance. It was indicated,
however, by reliable confidential sources that police
infiltration is much more commonplace than the public
generally assumes.
For the purposes of this comment, surveillance means
the observation of group members and activities either
from within or without the group. Infiltration of a
closed dissident group is the type of surveillance to
which this comment is particularly directed.
3 For purposes of this comment a dissident group is
defined as a voluntary association which espouses a view
differing from an established view held or accepted by a
majority within the community.
Dissident groups may be divided into two categories.
The first category consists of open groups-groups with
agents who use disguise and deception to become
accepted members of the group"--in an effort to
obtain information regarding group motivations,
goals, and membership. Infiltration tactics become
particularly useful to the police when group ranks
are dosed to the general public and the identity of
group members is not common knowledge.
negligible control or concern over the source and back-
ground of their membership. Such groups characteris-
tically hold meetings open to the public and make no
effort to maintain the security of a limited audience at
group meetings. A street comer rally might be classified
as an open group meeting.
The second category of dissident groups consists of
closed groups which attempt to control the make-up of
their membership through screening. Closed group
meetings are open to only a limited group of screened
members. The scope of this comment is specifically
limited to the constitutional issues arising from police
infiltration of dosed groups.
It is quite possible for a dosed group to exist within
an open group. For example, the leadership of the
Youth International Party anti-war demonstration at
the Chicago Democratic Convention of 1968 was a
dosed group existing within the open group structure of
general anti-war dissent.
4 It is assumed in this comment that the leadership
of law enforcement agencies decide which groups war-
rant undercover investigation. The factors which guide
the outcome of this decision are critical when and if the
legality of such investigative police activity should
later be questioned in court. See text at 193 infra.5Infiltrators are often trained professionals, who
suffer replacement or discharge from their assignment
if they fail to supply police with the information they
desire. Since the purpose of any police investigation
should be to acquire accurate information, possible
problems inherent in the use of infiltration tactics
should be recognized. Specifically, because a secret
agent's success depends upon his ability to produce
information useful in attaining arrests or gaining in-
sights into group activities, an agent may be tempted to
fabricate needed information or to exaggerate facts.
Because of the nature of any infiltration assignment,
there may be little opportunity for group members to
challenge the veracity of an agent's allegations. Fur-
thermore, the flexibility of a group's programs and plans
may become an easy rationale for explaining away any
group activity inconsistent with the agent's predictions
and allegations. Because there is no absolute means by
which to measure the accuracy of an agent's accounts of
otherwise secret group activity, what appears to the
police and public to be apparent reliability in past
investigations is dubious assurance of an agent's credi-
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COMMENT
There are basically three groups of cases which
seem to relate to undercover infiltration of dosed
dissident groups. The first group consists of cases
which limit the investigatory power of legislative
bodies6 and which suggest that surveillance or the
threat of surveillance imposes a chilling effect on
the exercise of free speech and assembly and there-
fore represents an unconstitutional infringement of
these First Amendment rightsY These cases restrict
legislative investigation of groups and group mem-
bership to those situations where the government
can show a compelling state interest to justify its
restrictive actions.'
bility in fact. D. Parr, SPiS AND INroRRs IN
WiTNEss-Box 14 (London 1958).
A particularly successful agent may even infiltrate a
group's hierarchy and be called upon to participate in
substantive decision making. The functioning of a
planted informer on this level within the group gives
rise to related questions regarding the defense of en-
trapment. See e.g. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S.
369 (1958). For the purposes of this paper, however,
consideration is restricted to circumstances where the
infiltrator limits himself to mere surveillance and pas-
sive participation in group activity, thereby avoiding
the role of group provocateur, and, consequently, the
issue of entrapment is beyond the scope of this com-
ment. Cowen, The Entrapment Defense in the Federal
Courts and Some State Court Comparisons, 49 J. Cmm.
L.C. & P.S. 447 (1959).
r DeGregory v. Attorney General of New Hampshire,
383 U.S. 825 (1966) (state committee's investigation
into defendant's prior affiliation with Communist Party
held to be a violation of First Amendment right to
associational privacy because state showed no nexus
between defendant's conduct and the compelling state
interest of self-preservation); Gibson v. Florida Leg.
Investigatory Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963) (legislative
investigation into group membership must yield to
First Amendment right to freedom of association where
no subversive or illegal activity is shown); Sweezy v.
New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957) (because state
failed to show nexus between Progressive Party and a
compelling state interest in self-preservation, investiga-
tion by state committee into membership of Progressive
Party held to be in violation of First Amendment right
to political privacy); Watkins v. United States, 354
U.S. 178 (1957) (questioning union officer about mem-
bers known to be former Communists held beyond
House Committee on UnAmerican Activities' power to
investigate Communism in labor).
7 Local 309, U.F.W. v. Gates, 75 F. Supp. 620 (N.D.
Ind. 1948) (police attendance at union meetings en-joined as a hinderance to members' First Amendment
right to speak privately and hold private meetings);
Anderson v. Sills, No. C-215-68 (Sup. Ct. of N.J.,
Chancery Div.) (unreported opinion) (maintenance of
police intelligence files on participants in political
demonstrations held to be unconstitutional inasmuch as
existence of files served to deter citizens from exercising
First Amendment rights of free speech and assembly).
See also cases cited in note 6 supra.8 Although the majority of the Court has ruled that
First Amendment rights are.subject to a balancing test
against compelling state interests, Justice Black and
The second group of cases apply the Fourth
Amendment to evidence obtained by means of
electronic eavesdropping apparatus.9 These cases
indicate that evidence obtained in such a manner
without complying with the Fourth Amendment
represents the fruit of an unreasonable search and
seizure.
The third group of decisions assert the existence
of a right to privacy protected by the Bill of Rights
from governmental interferenceY' These cases hold
that a legitimate governmental objective to control
or prohibit activities subject to official regulation
may not be achieved by means which sweep too
broadly and thereby invade the area of freedoms
protected by the Bill of Rights.
It is the purpose of this comment to consider the
application of these cases to police infiltration and
Justice Douglas hold that application of a balancing
test is inappropriate in cases when governmental action
directly infringes upon First Amendment rights. See
e.g. Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 262, 271
(1961) (Douglas & Black, JJ., dissenting). Since sur-
veillance or the threat of surveillance is best classified
an indirect infringement on First Amendment rights,
the balancing test is indeed appropriate to any deter-
mination of the constitutionality of dissident group
surveillance.
9 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (elec-
tronic eavesdropping held to constitute a violation of
defendant's justifiable reliance on privacy of his sur-
roundings and therefore held to be an unreasonable
search and seizure prohibited by the Fourth Amend-
ment); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505(1961) (use of electronic device to listen to defendant's
conversations within the privacy of his home without a
valid warrant held to constitute an unreasonable search
and seizure); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438(1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (use of evidence ob-
tained by wiretapping is in violation of the constitu-
tional right to be let alone protected by the Fourth
Amendment from governmental intrusion). See gen-
erally Comment, Federal Procedures for Court Ordered
Electronic Surveillance: Does It Meet the Standards of
Berger and Katz?, 60 J. Cam. L.C. & P.S. 203 (1969).
i0 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)
(overbroad state statute aimed at restricting illicit
sexual relations by prohibiting use of contraceptives by
married couples held to be a violation of citizens' right
to privacy and therefore unconstitutional); N.A.A.C.P.
v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288 (1964) (state regulatory
statute requiring submission of N.A.A.C.P. membership
lists to state authorities held to be overbroad and a
deprivation without due process of members' right to
associational privacy because state failed to show a
compelling state interest to justify disclosure of mem-
bership lists); Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S.
516 (1960) (statute requiring divulgence of N.A.A.C.P.
membership lists held to be a deprivation without due
process of members' right to freely associate); Louisiana
v. N.A.A.C.P., 181 F. Supp. 37 (E.D. La. 1960) (state
statute requiring submission of membership lists to
state authorities held to be a deprivation without due
process of citizens' right to associational privacy).
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surveillance of closed dissident groups. In addition,
the remedies available for limiting infiltration
tactics when applied to a dosed dissident group
will be examined.
FIRST AENDMENT
The First Amendment" guarantee of the right
to speak and assemble free from intrusion or inter-
ference by federal or state1 ' governments is jeop-
ardized by the infiltration or threat of infiltration
by police of dissident groups."
In Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Corn-
mittee,4 defendant was cited for contempt for refus-
ing to submit N.A.A.C.P. membership lists to a
state committee authorized to determine whether
specific individuals, otherwise identified as, or sus-
pected of being Communists, were N.A.A.C.P.
members. In reversing the ruling, the Court stated
that the
compelled disclosure of affiliation with groups
engaged in advocacy may constitute [an] ... effec-
tive ... restraint on freedom of association... [and]
n Congress shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press; or the right of the people to peaceably
assemble, and to petition the government for a
redress of grievances.
U.S. CozqsT. amend. I.
2 Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965); Edwards v.
South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963); N.A.A.C.P. v.
Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); Gitlow v. New York,
268 U.S. 652 (1925).
' Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951),
demonstrates how the Supreme Court in the past
twenty years has dealt with the argument that unau-
thorized surveillance threatens the free exercise of First
Amendment rights. In the court of appeals, 183 F.2d
201 (2d Cir. 1950), affd, 341 U.S. 494 (1951), defendant
objected to governmental use of undercover agents
against alleged political activity. Judge Learned Hand
dismissed the argument without referring to the First
Amendment. In granting certiorari, the Supreme Court
limited its consideration to the constitutionality of the
statute under which the defendant had been convicted
and did not discuss the propriety of the undercover
investigative methods used to obtain the convicting
evidence. Comment, Police Undercover Agents, 37 GEo.
WAsH. L. Rav. 634, 660 (1969).
Consistent with its treatment of the Dennis case, the
Court has thus far evaded direct confrontation with the
issue of admissibility of undercover agents' testimony
in criminal proceedings. See Osborn v. United States,
385 U.S. 323 (1966) and Hoffa v. United States, 385
U.S. 293 (1966). As the practice of police surveillance
of dissident groups becomes more commonplace, the
admissibility of evidence so acquired is challenged more
frequently. Consequently, the issue becomes ever more
difficult for the Court to circumvent.
" 372 U.S. 539 (1963).
... [i]nviolability of privacy in group association
may in many circumstances be indispensable to
preservation of freedom of association, particularly
where a group espouses dissident beliefs. 5
Although the Court in this case has shown
solicitude for one's right not to disclose his associ-
ates because of the inhibitory effect which the
threat of disclosure has upon the exercise of free
speech and assembly, it has consistently held that
these rights can be restricted under certain circum-
stances 8 If the state can demonstrate a compelling
state interest and a sufficient relationship or nexus
between the group being investigated and the
interest being asserted, the Court will generally
permit the encroachment 7
In Sweezy v. New Hampshire," the defendant
refused to submit to a state legislative committee's
inquiry into his knowledge of the Progressive Party
and its adherents on grounds that the inquiry in-
fringed upon his protected First Amendment rights.
In reversing the petitioner's conviction for con-
tempt, the Supreme Court of the United States
stated that, although a countervailing state interest
may have justified restricting petitioner's exercise
of free expression, there was no evidence to connect
the questioning of petitioner with the state interest
in protecting itself from Communist subversion."
The Court held that the petitioner's right to politi-
cal privacy could not be abridged under such cir-
cumstances. 0
1" Id. at 544.
16See e.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965);
Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960);
Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72 (1959); Barenblatt v.
United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959).
17 Gibson v. Florida Leg. Investigatory Comm., 372
U.S. 539 (1963).
The state's interest in adequate crowd and traffic
control is insufficient to justify the use of undercover
surve'llance and infiltration. Authorities might try to
justify infiltration of certain groups on grounds that
community interest requires constant reassurance that
group activities will remain passive. This argument is
incongruous with a society which espouses a system of
laws under which a man is innocent until proven guilty,
and in a society which preserves the right to free speech
and assembly over all but the most compelling state
interest. If such an argument is accepted as valid, police
are effectively given the absolute discretion to deter-
mine which groups constitute an overt threat to society,
which groups constitute a vague, potential threat to
society, and which groups present absolutely no threat
to society. Moreover, such an argument gives the police
absolute license to deal with any given group according
to the classification under which the group is arbitrarily
deemed by the police to fall.
Is 354 U.S. 234 (1957).




Those cases which limit the right of a legislative
body to compel the disclosure by a group member
of the group's membership list offer support for the
proposition that the threat of disclosure of one's
associates and associations resulting from the sub-
jection of a group to secret police infiltration im-
poses a chilling effect on the free exercise of private
assembly.2' The fact that legislative inquiries are
directed at the enactment of new laws rather than
the enforcement of existing laws is not a meaningful
distinction. Both practices are aimed at procuring
information. One seeks compulsory disclosure; the
other seeks information through deception. In
either situation, the divulgence of information is
involuntary. Moreover information which is
privileged from compulsory divulgence to legisla-
tive investigators should also be privileged from
discovery by police infiltrators.
The principle that police surveillance infringes
First Amendment rights was recognized by a
federal district court in Local 309, U.F.W. v. Gates.2
There, plaintiffs sought to enjoin local uniformed
police officials from sitting in on union meetings.
Plaintiffs alleged that the presence of uniformed
state police officers at union meetings prevented
union members from discussing freely matters
which related to the purpose of meeting. The police
contended that such observation was necessitated
by the union's recent participation in violent ac-
tivities. The court noted that
[t]he freedom and liberty to express ourselves
privately and to hold private assemblies for lawful
purposes and in a lawful manner without govern-
mental interference or hindrance is protected
as much by the First Amendment as the right to
do so publicly.P
" The members of several groups feel that public
disclosure of statements of a political nature made
during the course of meetings might result in
harassment by police officials, even though the
statements themselves are not criminal. Suspicion
that certain members of the group might be work-
ing for the local police or the FBI may prevent
such statements from ever being aired. Further-
more, this dampening effect extends beyond the
realm of political action groups; many citizens are
willing to relate certain semi-private matters to
friends, relatives, or business associates, but would
feel that their privacy had been infringed if they
knew that these matters were open to police in-
vestigation. Comment, Present and Suggested Lim-
itations on the Use of Secret Agents antJ Informers
in Law Enforcement, 41 U. CoLoRADo L. Rxv. 261,
279 (1969).'
12 75 F. Supp. 620 (N.D. Ind. 1948).23 Id. at 624.
And then, citing Thomas v. Collins,24 the court
stated that
[alny attempt to restrict those liberties [secured by
the First Amendment] must be justified by clear
public interest, threatened not doubtfully or
remotely, but by clear and present danger....
Accordingly, whatever occasion would restrain
orderly discussion and persuasion, at appropriate
time and place, must have clear support in public
danger, actual or impending. Only the gravest
abuses, endangering paramount interests, give
occasion for permissible limitation. It is therefore
in our tradition to allow the widest room for dis-
cussion, the narrowest range for its restriction,
particularly when this right is exercised in con-
junction with peaceable assembly.25
The Gates decision was an easy case because it
involved obvious police presence within the group;
however the principles underlying Gates are equally
applicable to cases where police surveillance is less
patent. It should not be necessary that members
possess actual knowledge of the identity or the
presence of an agent within the group. Even with-
out such knowledge the chilling effect is the same.
The situation is analogous to that found in cases
dealing with the legality of employers' hiring in-
dustrial spies to infiltrate trade unions for the pur-
pose of acquiring information concerning union
activities. 26 Such activity has been held to consti-
tute a restraint on employees' right to form unions
and engage in concerted union activity, regardless
of whether the employees actually realize that they
are being surveyed.27 The frequency with which
- 323 U.S. 516 (1945).
21 Id. at 530, cited in 75 F. Supp. at 624-25.
21National Labor Relations Board v. Grower-
Shipper Veg. Assoc. of Central Calif., 122 F.2d 368
(9th Cir. 1941) and Bethlehem Steel Co. v. National
Labor Relations Board, 120 F.2d 641 (D.C. Cir. 1941)
(use of undercover agents by employers to spy on
employees' union activity held to be a restraint on
employees' right to freely form and join union groups).
27 122 F.2d at 376; 120 F.2d at 647. Section 7 of the
National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 157, states:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization,
to form, join, or assist labor organizations,...
and to engage in other concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining....
Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act,
29 U.S.C. § 158(a), states:(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an em-
ployer-(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees
in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section
7; ...
The employment of undercover agents to spy on
employees engaged in union activities has been held a
violation of Section 8(a) (1) of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, even though the employees failed to realize
that they were being surveyed.
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infiltration tactics are employed by police today
creates a threat of surveillance which may itself
constitute sufficient basis for group members to
complain of a chilling effect on their exercise of free
speech and assembly.
The actual knowledge of the members that one
of their group is a police infiltrator presents no
problem of relief. The group can simply expel the
intruder, or get a section 1983 injunction if a con-
stitutional violation is established. 2s In the case,
however, where speech and association is affected
only by the reasonable fear of intrusion, the most
effective relief would appear to be a change in the
policy of the governmental entity engaging in the
unconstitutional conduct. In addition, it is sub-
mitted that any information obtained by police
through conduct that- demonstrably infringes First
Amendment rights should be excluded in any subse-
quent criminal proceeding involving the investi-
gated parties. This approach, termed the exclu-
sionary rule,29 has been adopted by the Supreme
Court to deter police conduct which violates the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments. 0 Its application to
police conduct which erodes the freedoms of speech
and assembly may be helpful.
FotumH AmrF Dm
The protection of personal security provided by
the Fourth Amendment"n may be infringed by
undercover police surveillance. However, the
Court has thus far declined to make a definite and
unqualified determination of the admissibility,
under the Fourth Amendment, of information
acquired by means of infiltration and undercover
surveillance of closed dissident groups without a
warrant. judicial attention in the past has been
restricted to cases involving the observation of
actual criminal activity." In such cases the Court
2842 U.S.C. §1983(1964). See text at 192-193 infra.
See generally The Exclusionary Rule Regarding
Illegally Seized Evidence: An International Symposium,
52 J. Camn. L. C. & P. S. 245 (1961).
20See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
31 The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
"Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966) and
Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966) are recent
cases in which testimony of an undercover agent was
used to obtain a criminal conviction.
... "Courts have countenanced the use of in-
formers from time immemorial; in cases of con-
has ruled that a secret government informer is
subject to "all [the] relevant constitutional re-
strictions ... [imposed upon] any other govern-
ment agent... ." Undercover agents have
seldom been called by the state to testify to the
nature of group activities as witnesses in trial pro-
ceedings. However, the frequency with which such
testimony is used as evidence is increasing, and as
the use of undercover infiltration of dissident
groups becomes more common there is an ever
greater probability of a clear-cut judicial deter-
mination of the admissibility of agent's testimony
as evidence. The issues confronting the Court at
such a time will compel it to define more precisely
what "relevant constitutional restrictions" are
applicable when undercover tactics are particularly
directed against closed groups engaged in active
dissent.
4
Two cases decided in the 1966 term demonstrate
the Court's most recent approach to the Fourth
Amendment issues raised by infiltration tactics:
spiracy, or in other cases when the crime consists
of preparing for another crime, it is usually neces-
sary to rely upon them or upon accomplices be-
cause the criminals will almost certainly proceed
covertly...."
385 U.S. at 311.
33 385 U.S. at 311.
"Defense attorneys for the eight men accused of
crossing state lines to incite the Chicago riots during the
1968 Democratic Convention recently confronted
udge Julius J. Hoffman of the federal district court
with precisely this issue. The attorneys made a motion
to suppress the testimony of police secret agents as-
signed to survey several of the defendants during the
Chicago disturbance. The defense contended that such
a twenty-four hour, unprivileged and unlimited sur-
veillance without a warrant constituted an unreasonable
search and seizure, and, therpfore, the information so
obtained was inadmissable under the exclusionary rule
of the Fourth Amendment. The motion was denied by
the district court, and the issue has yet to be raised on
appeal. United States v. Dellinger, No. 69 CR 180(N.D. IM., Feb. 20, 1970); appeal docketed, No. 18295,
7th Cir., Feb. 28, 1970.
Similar factual situations confronted the Court in
Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323 (1966) and Hoffa
v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966). However in both
these cases the Court successfully avoided the clear-cut
issue of admissibility as evidence of knowledge obtained
through undercover surveillance of the defendants. In
Ho.ffa, the Court avoided confronting the exclusionary
rule by imposing the doctrine of waiver on the defend-
ant. See text at 186-187 infra. In Osborn, the Court ig-
nored the issue of the admissibility of an agent's testi-
mony regarding a conversation which the agent had
tape-recorded. The state sought to admit the tape
solely as corroborating evidence to the agent's testi-
mony. Following precedent set in Lopez v. United
States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963), the Court held that the
taped conversation was admissible as corroborating
evidence, but the Court failed to address itself to the




Lewis v. United States5 and Hoffa v. United States.36
The Lewis case raised the issue of whether the de-
fendant's Fourth Amendment rights were violated
by the admission into evidence of testimony from a
federal narcotics agent. After misrepresenting his
identity and expressing to the defendant an interest
in buying marihuana, the agent was invited to the
defendant's home and was sold quantities of the
contraband.
Appealing his conviction for sale of narcotics, the
defendant contended that, in the absence of a war-
rant, the agent's intrusion upon the privacy of his
home constituted an unreasonable search and
seizure; and, therefore, the agent's testimony was
inadmissible under the Fourth Amendment. Fur-
thermore, it was contended that the defendant's
invitation to the agent should not constitute a
waiver of defendant's Fourth Amendment rights
when the invitation to enter and observe is induced
by fraud and deception.n
The Court dismissed defendant's argument and
stated that "the particular circumstances of each
case govern the admissibility of evidence obtained
by stratagem and deception," 11 and that, in this
case, the defendant's rights were not violated be-
cause defendant waived his right to security from
governmental intrusion into his business transac-
tions when he invited the agent to his home for the
specific purpose of executing a felonious sale of
narcotics with him. Because the agent did not see,
hear, or take anything not contemplated, and in
fact intended, by the defendant as a necessary part
of executing that felonious sale, the Court felt that
the defendant could not claim that the information
so acquired by the agent was within the realm of
privacy protected from unreasonable governmental
intrusion by the Fourth Amendment. 39 Essentially,
the Court ruled that petitioner could not reasona-
bly claim Fourth Amendment immunity from
governmental intrusion into his apartment when,
in the course of executing illegal business transac-
tions, petitioner freely opened his apartment to the
public in general.
The Court in Lewis stated that "[a] government
agent, in the same manner as a private person, may
accept an invitation to do business and may enter
upon the premises for the very purpose contem-
5385 U.S. 206 (1966).
6 385 U.S. 293 (1966).
385 U.S. at 208.9 Id.
19 385 U.S. at 210.
plated by the occupant . .", o and if, during the
course of accomplishing that purpose, the govern-
ment agent acquires incriminating information,
such information is admissible as evidence in a
criminal proceeding. This indicates that the govern-
ment may infiltrate some groups and gain admis-
sible evidence provided its agent's activity remains
within the scope of general group conduct and does
not exceed the purpose for which the agent was
originally "invited" to join.
For the purposes of our analysis, however, the
Lewis case and others like it can be factually dis-
tinguished from cases involving the undercover
surveillance of dissident groups. The Court in
Lewis was dealing with a defendant suspected of
criminal conduct; and, in such a context, the Court
found it reasonable to impose the risk of "faulty
character judgment" on persons engaged in nar-
cotics traffic. But prior to subjecting Lewis to
undercover observation, the Court noted that the
police had probable cause to believe that Lewis was
engaged in criminal activity!' Thus the search was
in accordance with Fourth Amendment standards
on that ground also.
A concept of waiver similar to that employed in
the Lewis decision was also used by the Court to
justify the decision in Hoffa v. United States.2 In
40 Id. at 211. The Court went on to state,
[o]f course, this does not mean that, whenever
entry is obtained by invitation and the locus is
characterized as a place of business, an agent is
authorized to conduct a general search for incrim-
inating materials....
See Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921) (evi-
dence seized by a business friend of defendant after
friend, who was invited into defendant's office on a
social call, searched defendant's drawers; evidence held
inadmissible under Fourth Amendment). The Court in
Lewis distinguished the Gouled decision on the grounds
that, in Gou/ed, the agent had been invited into de-
fendant's office on a social basis and the evidence had
not been voluntarily submitted to the agent in the
course of the social call.
41385 U.S. at 208-09 n.4.
42 In order to justify the holding that the defendant
"waived" his right to privacy and freedom from self-
incrimination, both the Lewis and the Hoffa decision
make use of the fact that the defendant "voluntarily"
made incriminating statements around the agent. The
Supreme Court's willingness to classify the defendants'
incriminating statements to undisclosed and unsus-
pected undercover agents as voluntary waivers of their
right to privacy and freedom from self-incrimination is
surprising, if not incongruous, in light of the strict
criteria by which the authenticity and voluntariness of
a "waiver" is judged in recent Supreme Court cases
dealing with the issue of waiver. Cf. Miranda v. Ari-
zona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) and Escobedo v. United
States, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
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that case an acquaintance of Hoffa was instructed
by police authorities to infiltrate the defendant's
circle of associates, "hang around" the defendant's
hotel room, and report back to government
authorities any suspicious activities which he ob-
served. Because he was a friend of the defendant,
the agent initially gained entrance into the de-
fendant's hotel room by invitation and was al-
lowed to hear confidential conversations which took
place between Hoffa and several other persons
within the privacy of Hoffa's hotel room. When the
agent's testimony resulted in Hoffa's conviction for
jury tampering, it was contended on appeal4" that
Certainly, the Court cannot maintain that a de-
fendant or a dissident group makes a "knowing waiver"
of its rights when the defendant or dissident group
"voluntarily" divulges information to a person who is an
undisclosed and unsuspected government agent.
One might argue, however, that the Miranda ruling
was prompted by considerations unique to "in custody"
interrogation procedure and, as such, the Miranda
doctrine of waiver should not be extended to apply to
infiltration cases. For example, Miranda was principally
aimed at prohibiting physical coercion of legally un-
sophisticated indigent suspects within the secretive
confines of the station house. Therefore, it might be
contended that its doctrine should not be extended to
protect the sophisticated criminal whose illegal activity
can be detected in absolutely no other manner than
through undercover surveillance.
On the other hand, deceit and fraud can be the imple-
ments of coercion as well as can physical force, and,
therefore, the secretive nature of undercover activity
warrants Miranda protection just as much as do the
impenetrable confines of the station house. Further-
more, the rights delineated in the Miranda decision are
based on the provisions in the Fourth and Fifth Amend-
ments. The protection of the Constitution is not limited
to merely indigent or legally unsophisticated citizens,
but, rather, extends to every citizen of the United
States-even the most criminally sophisticated rack-
eteer-and, particularly, it extends to protect the
member of a dissident group.
A disclosure of information which a dissident group
is tricked into making to a clever infiltrator is no more
a voluntary disclosure than is a confession which a sus-
pect is coerced into making to a clever police interro-
gator. Therefore, employing the philosophy of Miranda,
the information divulged to the agent should be inad-
missible as evidence for the same reasons that the
confession of a coerced suspect is inadmissible as evi-
dence in a criminal proceeding.
43 In addition to arguing on the grounds of Fourth
Amendment provisions, Hoffa also contended that use
of the agent's testimony as evidence was in violation of
his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights, and the consti-
tutional guarantee of due process.
Hoffa contended that the use of the agent's testi-
mony violated the Fifth Amendment protection against
compulsory self-incrimination. In answer to this argu-
ment, the Court ruled that a necessary element of com-
pulsory self-incrimination is some kind of compulsion,
and, since Hoffa's conversations with and around the
the prior consent which defendant gave to the
agent's presence in the room was vitiated by the
agent's failure to disclose his identity as a govern-
ment informer. By listening to the defendant's
incriminating statements with the intention of
relaying acquired information to police authorities,
it was claimed that the agent had overstepped the
purpose for which he had been invited to enter
the room. Therefore, in essence, the defense
claimed the agent had violated Hoffa's reasonable
expectation of privacy and had conducted an
unprivileged and illegal search of the premises,
the fruits of which are inadmissible as evidence
against the defendant by the Fourth Amendment.
The Court dismissed this argument and affirmed
the conviction" stating that the Fourth Amend-
ment protects only
the security [which] a man relies upon when he
places himself or his property within a constitu-
tionally protected area. . . .45 ... In the present
case, however, it is evident that no interest legiti-
mately protected by the Fourth Amendment is
agent were wholly voluntary, no right protected by the
Fifth Amendment had been violated.
Hoffa's allegation that his Sixth Amendment right to
counsel had been violated was based on the agent's
presence during certain confidential conversations which
petitioner had with the attorney handling the trial in
which Hoffa was convicted of jury tampering. Hoffa
claimed the agent's presence violated the attorney-
client privilege secured by the Sixth Amendment. On
this point, the Court ruled that, even if Hoffa's right to
counsel had been violated, that fact could only affect
the validity of his conviction under the original charge
in which his attorney was involved when the privilege
was breached, but would not involve Hoffa's later con-
viction for jury tampering.
Lastly, Hoffa's contention that due process had been
denied was based on the broad grounds that "the
'totality' of the Government's conduct ... operated
... to offend those canons of decency and fairness
which express the notions of justice...." The Court
summarily dismissed this last contention, stating that
the use of informers under certain circumstances had
been justifiably countenanced by the courts from time
immemorial, and that the Court chose not to rule the
use of informers unconstitutional per se. By dismissing
Hoffa's due process argument, the Court in this case
chose, in fact, to overlook the dubious character of the
government informer involved, and the consequent
possibility that his testimony might be shaded or un-
reliable. 385 U.S. at 304, 305, 310-11.
"385 U.S. at 300.
45 As discussed infra at p. 188-90, such reliance on
privacy must be objectively evidenced and, also, recog-
nized by society as reasonable. In this case, the Court
decided that the defendant's reliance on the faithfulness
of his friend was not reasonable and therefore did not
place the defendant within the scope of Fourth Amend-
ment protection.
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involved .... [T]he petitioner, in a word, was not
relying on the security of the hotel room; he was
relying upon [the] misplaced confidence [that his
friend] would not reveal his wrong-doing.46
The Court concluded that no right protected
by the Fourth Amendment was violated by the
use in this case of agent's testimony as evidence.47
The Court, however, failed to consider that
Hoffa's willingness to talk freely might not have
been merely a consequence of his "misplaced
confidence" in his friend; rather, his willingness
to talk freely might have been a consequence of
his reasonable assumption that the government
would not attempt to spy on him in the privacy
of his hotel room.48 Therefore, even though the
Court was ready to hold that the risk that a
friend might deceive him was not an unreasonable
burden to impose upon the defendant, it does not
follow that, in light of sophisticated undercover
techniques now employed by law enforcement
agencies, the average citizen of a free society should
be asked to assume the risk that his government
will spy on him and use his friends to infiltrate
and survey his most confidential dealings con-
ducted within the relied upon privacy of closed
quarters. Similarly, dissident groups which demon-
strate an objective and reasonable reliance on the
security of their group alliance should not be
compelled to bear the risk that trusted group mem-
bers may in fact be police agents.
Precedent for determining the status of under-
cover infiltration and surveillance under the Fourth
Amendment might be found in recent decisions
dealing with wiretapping. In Katz v. United States,4 9
the Court ruled that eavesdropping on conversa-
tions without a warrant by means of an electronic
device is a violation of privacy upon which a
citizen justifiably relies and is an unreasonable
search and seizure forbidden by the Fourth Amend-
ment. Consequently, the information so acquired
was deemed inadmissible as evidence in a criminal
proceeding.5
46 385 U.S. at 301-02.
47 385 U.S. at 303.
48 Comment, Judicial Control of Secret Agents, 76
YALE L. J. 994, 1012.(1967).
4 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
0 [Tlhe premise that property interests control the
right of the government to search and seize has
been discredited.... [ihe Fourth Amendment
protects people--and not simply "areas"-against
unreasonable searches and seizures.... [T]he reach
of that Amendment cannot turn upon the presence
or absence of a physical intrusion into any given
enclosure.
Id. at 353. See generally comment, supra note 9.
51389 U.S. at 359.
A close parallel can be drawn between wire-
tapping and undercover surveillance because
many factors which prompted the strict control
and limitation of wiretapping are also inherent
in the practice of undercover surveillance. Both
methods of investigation are covert in nature and
serve the purpose of acquiring information used
by the police which cannot readily be acquired by
alternate means. While the strict control of wire-
tapping is based upon a general reluctance to
leave the scope of such tactics purely to the dis-
cretion of the police,52 the use of police infiltration
of dissident groups is presently subject to no
control other than that of police discretion. The
secretive nature of both undercover surveillance
and wiretapping activity affords ample opportunity
for conduct in violation of that personal security
protected generally by the Fourth Amendment.
Most important, both wiretapping and under-
cover surveillance invade aspects of privacy
related to the spoken word: the privacy of a con-
fidential conversation is violated by an electronic
eavesdropping device in the next room just as
much as by a human eavesdropper in the very
area in which the conversation occurs. The only
distinction between the two types of investigation
is that one is accomplished by means of a sophis-
ticated electronic device, while the other is ac-
complished by means of human ingenuity and
infiltration skill. The Court's concern that the
citizen of a free society should not be subjected
to the unrestricted threat of sophisticated elec-
tronic eavesdropping apparatus suggests that the
citizen also should not be subject to the unre-
stricted threat of sophisticated infiltration and
surveillance techniques presently employed by
police. The frequency with which police employ
52 It is a cardinal rule that, in seizing goods and ar-
ticles, law enforcement agents must secure and use
search warrants wherever reasonably practicable.
... This rule rests on the desirability of having
magistrates rather than police officers determine
when searches and seizures are permissible and
what limitations should be placed on such activi-
ties.
Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699,705 (1948).
... [T]he right to search and seizure should not be
left to the mere discretion of the police, but should,
as a matter of principle, be subjected to the re-
quirement of previous judicial sanction wherever
possible.
Id. at 709-10. If police were given absolute discretionary
control over the scope of wiretapping and search and
seizure investigation, it was predicted that police in-
centive to acquire information might frequently over-
ride their reluctance to invade areas protected by the
Fourth Amendment.
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undercover infiltration as a means of investigation"
indicates that the magnitude of the threat to
privacy represented by this means of investigation
is no less than that threat to privacy which
prompted the Court's ruling on wiretapping."
If one accepts the analogy suggested by the
similar function and motivation common to such
investigative techniques as wiretapping and
undercover surveillance, it follows that both such
investigative techniques should be subject to the
sanctions of the Fourth Amendment.-" Case law
provides extensive guidelines limiting the use of
investigative search and seizure or wiretrapping
to circumstances where a search warrant has been
issued upon a proper showing of probable cause
to believe a crime has been or is being committed."
In light of the correlation between undercover
surveillance and such investigative tactics as
wiretapping, it is reasonable to assert that the use
of undercover surveillance and infiltration should
also be subject to the showing of sufficient prob-
able cause to merit issuance of a search warrant.
RIOHT TO PRIVACY
The Supreme Court has interpreted provisions
within the Bill of Rights to include a constitu-
5 Cf. N. Y. Times, Feb. 26, 1970, at 35 col., 1 (city
ed.).
4[The framers of the Constitution] conferred, as
against the government, the right to be left
alone .... To protect that right, every unjustifiable
intrusion by the government upon the privacy of
the individual, whatever the means employed, must
be deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment.
And the use, as evidence in a criminal proceeding,
of facts ascertained by such intrusion must be
deemed a violation of the Fifth.
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478-79 (1928)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting).
15 One might also contend that the principles under-
lying the Court's recent decisions placing limits on
police interrogative practices should be applied also to
police infiltration practices. Cf. 384 U.S. 436 (1966) and
378 U.S. 478 (1964). See generally Comment, supra
note 44.
6 The exclusionary rule is so applied in Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. at 357. Even though the police
in Katz had probable cause to believe that the defend-
ant's telephone was being used to conduct illegal
betting, and even though the police restricted the elec-
tronic surveillance strictly to defendant's conversations
only, the evidence so obtained was deemed inadmissible
because the police had failed to obtain judicial authori-
zation for the tapping. The Court emphasized that
... the mandate of the [Fourth] Amendment re-
quires adherence to judicial processes... and
... searches conducted outside the judicial process
... are per se unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment....
Id. at 357; accord, Silverman v. United States, 365
U.S. 505 (1961).
tionally protected right to privacy. 7 Although
Griswold v. Connecticut,', the major decision as-
serting a right to privacy, centers around a factual
situation far removed from that of undercover
surveillance, the principles underlying that case
are broad enough to encompass the practice of
dissident group infiltration. In Griswold a majority
of the Court declared that a right to maintain
confidential relationships falls within the penumbra
of the Bill of Rights. 59 This right to private asso-
ciations might be deemed violated when police
use the trust relation of a citizen's friendship in
order to monitor that citizen's words and ac-
tivities.
It is suggested however that, if such a right to
maintain confidential relationships is to be recog-
nized, it should be qualified to a certain extent.
Specifically, any person or group asserting such a
67Various [Constitutional] guarantees create zones
of privacy. The right of association contained in
the penumbra of the First Amendment is one, as
we have seen. The Third Amendment in its pro-
hibition against the quartering of soldiers "in any
house" in time of peace without the consent of the
owner is another facet of that privacy. The Fourth
Amendment explicitly affirms the "right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures." The Fifth Amendment in its Self-In-
crimination Clause enables the citizen to create a
zone of privacy which government may not force
him to surrender to his detriment. The Ninth
Amendment provides: "The enumeration in the
Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be con-
strued to deny or disparage others retained by the
people."
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,484 (1965).
... The protection guaranteed by the [Fourth and
Fifth] Amendments is much broader in scope. The
makers of our Constitution undertook to secure
conditions favorable to the pursuit of happiness
.... They sought to protect Americans in their
beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions, and their
sensations. They conferred as against the Govern-
ment, the right to be left alone-the most compre-
hensive of rights and the right most valued by
civilized man.
Id. at 494 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
Inviolability of privacy in group association may in
many circumstances be indispensable to preserva-
tion of freedom of association, particularly where a
group espouses dissident beliefs.
357 U.S. at 462; 372 U.S. at 544. See also Stanley V.
Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
s381 U.S. 479 (1965).
51 The majority decision in Griswold was split upon
the issue of whether the scope of rights protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment should include not only rights
explicitly guaranteed to the people in the Bill of Rights
but also those rights which are inferred to fall within the
"penumbra" of constitutional protection. Nevertheless,
the majority did agree that the right to privacy was
within the scope of rights generally guaranteed by the
Constitution. Justice Black and Justice Stewart dis-
sented from the majority.
1970]
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right should be required to show evidence of an
actual expectation of privacy, 60 and, furthermore,
the expectation of privacy must be one which
society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. 61
For example, in judging whether the First
Amendment protects the privacy of a dissident
group's activities, a court should consider
whether the activity was held in dosed sessions
or in sessions open to the public (though not
necessarily open to police officers). A meeting
held in closed session would demonstrate an actual
expectation of privacy, while a meeting held in
open session might not. A court should also ex-
amine the extensiveness of the group's efforts to
security screen its members and restrict its mem-
bership. The more elaborate a screening procedure
the group employs, the more reasonable is the
group's expectation of privacy.
2
Because the right to privacy falls within the
scope of the Bill of Rights' protection, it is subject
to yet a third qualification; the Constitution
prohibits only violations of citizens' privacy by
state or federal officials.63 Therefore, while police
infiltration might qualify as an unconstitutional
violation of an individual's right to privacy, the
commonplace situation where police receive in-
formation from a conscientious citizen or a self-
appointed informer does not constitute a violation
66For example, divulging a secret to a supposed
friend within the confines of a hotel room would con-
stitute an exhibition of an actual expectation of privacy.61389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
6 2 Using these suggested criteria, an open dissident
group does not demonstrate an actual and reasonable
expectation of privacy, and, therefore, does not qualify
for the Bill of Rights' protection of that privacy. On the
other hand, the closed group's justifiable reliance on
security measures and membership screening does dem-
onstrate an actual and reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy. Therefore, if the privacy of closed dissident
groups is protected by the Bill of Rights, violation of
that privacy by police infiltrators constitutes illegal ac-
tivity by the state.
63 One who invites or admits an old "friend" takes, I
think, the risk that the "friend" will ... disclose
confidences or that the Government will wheedle
them out of him. The case for me is different when
the government plays the ignoble role of "planting"
an agent in one's living room or uses fraud and de-
ception in getting him there. These practices are at
war with the constitutional standards of privacy
which are part of our choicest tradition.... In the
one case, the Government has merely been the will-
ing recipient of information supplied by a fickle
friend. In the other, the Government has actively
encouraged and participated in a breach of privacy
by sending in an undercover agent. 385 U.S. at
347 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
of the right to privacy as it is protected in the
Bill of Rights."
RE EmEs
Cases arising under the First and Fourth Amend-
ment commonly question the constitutionality
of the application of a statute or other regulative
governmental action to individual citizens6 5 or
members of a group. 66 The courts seek to deter-
mine if a statute or state action deprives the
party in question of a constitutional right pro-
tected by these amendments. Before a group has
standing to challenge the legality of undercover
tactics under the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth
Amendments, it must first establish that such
police observation does in fact deprive its members
of rights within the scope of constitutional pro-
tection.
If police infiltration and surveillance of dis-
sident groups does infringe upon the group's
freedom of speech and right to associational
privacy, there are several federal remedies avail-
able. These remedies are found in the enforcement
acts passed to implement the Civil War Amend-
ments, particularly the Fourteenth. 67 Section 241,0s
4 Therefore, under the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments, law enforcement officials are not prohibited from
passively availing themselves of private sources of in-
formation but are prohibited from conduct which con-
stitutes active instigation of surveillance or planting of
informants.
Neither the ordinary citizen nor the confessed crim-
inal should be discouraged from reporting what he
knows to the authorities and from lending his aid to
secure evidence of crime.
377 U.S. at 212 (White, J., dissenting).65 E.g., Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951)
(conviction for disorderly conduct); Whitney v. Cali-
fornia, 274 U.S. 357 (1927) (conviction under the Cali-
fornla Criminal Syndicalism Act); Gitlow v. New York,
268 U.S. 652 (1925) (conviction under a New York crim-
inal anarchy statute); Schenk v. United States, 249 U.S.
47 (1919) (violation of the 1917 Espionage Act).6 6 E.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965) (con-
viction for criminal conspiracy, disturbing the peace,
obstructing public passages, and picketing before a
courthouse); Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203
(1961) (violation of the membership clause of the Smith
Act); Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957) (vio-
lation of the Smith Act); Dennis v. United States, 341
U.S. 494 (1951) (violation of the conspiracy provisions
of the Smith Act).
1 See generally R. CAP.R, FEDERAL PROTECTION OF
CIVIL RImTS (1947); Gressman, The Unhappy History
of Civil Rights Legislation, 50 Mich. L. Rev. 1323
(1952); and Putzel, Federal Civil Rights Enforcement: A
Current Appraisal, 99 U. Pa. L. Rev. 439 (1951).
6 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1964). This section originated in
the Enforcement Act of May 31, 1870, Section 6, and
appeared in the Criminal Code of 1909 as Section 19.
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"Conspiracy against Rights of Citizens," pro-
vides:
If two or more persons conspire to injure, oppress,
threaten, or intimidate any citizen in the free
exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege
secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the
United States, or because of his having so exer-
cised the same... they shall be fined not more
than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten
years, or both; and if death results, they shall be
subject to imprisonment for any term of years or
for life.
Two questions immediately arise as to the
application of this section. First, do the terms of
the statute apply to a conspiracy among state
officers; and, second,. what rights are "secured by
the Constitution or laws of the United States."
Section 19 of the Criminal Code of 1909, pred-
ecessor of the present Section 241, was first
used for a prosecution of county election board
officers in 1915, in United States v. Mosley. 9 The
Supreme Court held that an indictment which
charged two members of a state election board
with failing to count ballots in a federal election
was valid. Although this was the first time this
section had been applied to state officers, justice
Holmes, writing the opinion, made no effort to
justify the application. Rather, the opinion focuses
on the right to have one's ballots counted fairly
in a federal election as a right within the section's
coverage. It was not until 1966 in United States
v. Price"0 that the Supreme Court dearly deter-
mined that Section 241 applied to public officials.
The Court in Price stated that Section 241 must
be read to include the rights and privileges pro-
tected by the Fourteenth Amendment,7 and,
therefore, Section 241 could be invoked against
state police officers.
A second possible sanction against police in-
fringement of constitutional rights is found in
In the 1926 Code it was changed to Section 51. The 1948
revision established this section as 241. In 1968, Con-
gress increased the fine and imprisonment penalties.
69 238 U.S. 383 (1915).
70383 U.S. 787 (1966).7' We cannot doubt that the purpose and effect of
§241 was to reach assaults upon rights under the
entire Constitution, including the Thirteenth,
Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments, and not
merely under part of it.
Id. at 805.
Section 242 of Title 18Y2 This section provides
that:
Whoever under the color of law, statute, ordinance,
regulation or custom, willfully subjects any inhab-
itant of any State, Territory, or District to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured or protected by the Constitution or laws
of the United States ... shall be fined not more
than $1000 or imprisoned not more than one year,
or both ....
Several differences between Section 241 and 242
are notable. Although Section 241 applies to
conspiracies between "two or more persons",
Section 242 covers the conduct of individuals
acting "under color of law". Moreover, Section
241 requires only that persons "conspire to injure",
but Section 242 requires that the alleged violator
actually subject a person to certain deprivations.
Finally, Section 241 covers "citizens", whereas
Section 242 protects "inhabitants of any State,
Territory or District".
With regard to the requirement that the ac-
tivity sanctioned by Section 242 be "under color
of law," the Court has held it immaterial whether
or not the accused is an officer of the state. Rather,
the defendant acts "under color of law" if he is a
willful participant in joint activity with the state
or with its agents.7' Therefore, state officials can
be indicted under Section 242 just as under Sec-
tion 241.
A common problem in invoking either Section
241 or 242 is that of determining when the dep-
rivation of a Constitutional right has been will-
ful 4 The Court construes. "willful" to mean the
intent to deprive a person of rights made specific
by the express terms of the Constitution 5
- 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1964).
7' 383 U.S. at 794 (numerous defendants, including
both police officials and private citizens, convicted
under § 242 for killing an arrested man after releasing
him from jail); Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91
(1945) (police officer is convicted under § 242 for beat-
ing a convicted man to death).74 Although § 241 does not specifically use the term
"willful," this requirement is implied by the essence of
the offense it sanctions, i.e., the nature of conspiracy
implies the intent on the part of the conspirators to
commit the offense.
75 325 U.S. at 104. Note that the Court in Screws
places the responsibility on courts, as well as on legis-
latures, to interpret the Constitution so as to effectively
define to the general populace the scope of their con-
stitutional rights, as well as the standards by which the
seriousness of any infringement on those rights is to bejudged. This duty of the courts was re-asserted in
Bowens v. Knazze, 237 F. Supp. 826, 829 (N.D. Ill.
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Although Section 241 and Section 242 theoreti-
cally provide significant protection for dissident
groups subjected to indiscriminate use of under-
cover surveillance by police officials, a considera-
tion of the practical application of Section 241
and Section 242 indicates otherwise. Section 241
and Section 242 are both criminal statutes which
require law enforcement agencies to prosecute
their own members who engage in unlawful sur-
veillance. It is doubtful that these laws will be
enforced with sufficient zeal to protect the rights
of dissident groups. Furthermore, Section 241
and Section 242 do not provide a means for dis-
sident groups to prevent surveillance before it has
actually occurred. Even if Sections 241 and 242
could in fact be enforced against police officers
they provide only a means of discouraging the
practice of indiscriminate and unjustified surveil-
lance after the fact.
Under the Civil Rights Act dissident group
members also have civil remedies against violators
of their constitutional rights. Section 1983 of
Title 4276 provides that
[elvery person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any
State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be sub-
jected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the depri-
vation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit
in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
The language of this section affords an action
against appropriate defendants for damages,
injunction, or other equitable relief from depriva-
tion of rights secured by the Constitution or
federal laws. Unlike Section 241 and Section 242,
Section 1983 can be used to obtain injunctive
relief before actual police surveillance is initiated,
providing a dissident group can demonstrate that
the threat of surveillance has an inhibitory effect
on the exercise of its Constitutional rights.
1965), when the court stated, "The measure of a citi-
zen's constitutional rights is not left to the community
at large; it is determined by the courts."
76 42 U.S.C. §1983 (1964). This section stems from
Section 1 of the Enforcement Act of April 20, 1871, and
is the civil counterpart of Section 242 of the Criminal
Code. Unlike Section 242, however, it is limited to acts
done under color of laws of "any State or Territory,"
and does not apply to acts done under color of federal
law.
In Monroe v. Pape,7 a case where plaintiff sued
thirteen police officers for damages arising from
an alleged illegal search, arrest, and detention,
the Court applied the same meaning to the phrase
"under color of law" as they had for 18 U.S.C.
Section 242, and held that police officers could be
sued under Section 1983. Furthermore, Monroe
established that it was not necessary to allege
that the defendant acted with the specific purpose
and intent of depriving the plaintiff of one of his
federal civil rights; rather, it is sufficient if the
plaintiff shows that defendant knew or as a rea-
sonable man should have known that his action
would deprive plaintiff of a civil right7 8
According to the Court in Bowens v. Knazze,79
a suit involving action under Section 1983 to
recover damages for an illegal search of the plaintiff
by an officer of the Chicago Police Department,
the applicability of Section 1983 to the facts of a
case must be determined
with reference to the standards of constitutional
protection current at the time that the defendant
acted..., [and] [slo long as the defendant's conduct
stems from his reasonable belief as to the require-
ments of the law and is not unreasonable in any
other way, he cannot be held responsible-under
the [reasonable man] standard of liability set forth
in Monroe v. Pape-for the deprivation of plain-
tiff's rights.P
In a suit brought by members of a dissident
group against police infiltrators under Section
1983, the defendants, as members of law enforce-
ment agencies, should be chargeable with a high
degree of knowledge regarding the "standard of
constitutional protection current at the time".
A law enforcement agency can be held liable for
any damages arising from its failure to conform
its conduct to that standard.81
-7365 U.S. 167 (1961). See also Downie v. Powers,
193 F.2d 760 (10th Cir. 1951); Robeson v. Fanelli, 94
F. Supp. 62 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
7 237 F. Supp. at 826.
The Civil Rights Act created a new type of tort:
the invasion, under color of law, of a citizen's con-
stitutional rights. The test of tortious conduct in
an ordinary tort case is, as a general rule, whether
at the time of the incident the defendant was negli-
gent, whether he failed to act as a reasonably pru-
dent man.
Id. at 828.
79 237 F.Supp. 826 (N.D. Ill. 1965).
80 Id. at 829.
11 The court in Bowens makes clear the importance of
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The possibility of collecting damages for the
tortious invasion of constitutional rights is of
little practical use to an infiltrated dissident group
since the group would have great difficulty proving
monetary damages resulting from surveillance.
Moreover, a tort recovery would become available
to the group only after they had in fact already
suffered surveillance. However, an injunctive
remedy is also available under Section 1983.
Unlike the previous remedies discussed, an in-
junction under Section 1983 would not operate to
merely punish police misconduct after the fact,
but, rather, it could be used to prevent surveil-
lance, or, at least, to prevent the continuance or
recurrence of surveillance which is shown to violate
the plaintiff's civil rights.
Local 309, U.F.W, v. Gates82 demonstrates the
possible use of the injunctive relief available under
Section 1983 to protect dissident groups from
unwanted police surveillance. In Gates, union
members succeeded in enjoining uniformed mem-
bers of the police department from attending
union meetings on the grounds that the presence
of the police invaded the members' rights of
speech and assembly. Even though the police
did not actively interfere with the meetings, it
was found that the known presence of police
officers effectively restrained union members from
freely discussing union affairs. The court's ap-
proach in Gates is particularly interesting because
the court chose to treat the issues of police sur-
veillance in the same manner as legislative inquiry
was treated in Sweezy and Gibsow. Although there
had been violence during a recent union strike
and although some of the union members had
criminal records, the court found that police
failed to show a sufficiently clear public interest to
justify such inhibitory surveillance. The group's
activities did not present a clear and present danger
to the public interest.
The court in Gates considered the relevant
questions of fact to be: (1) whether the assembly
being surveyed is lawful, (2) whether the group's
adequate delineation by the judiciary of "standards of
constitutional protection" when it says:
If that standard has not yet been enunciated by a
court in a manner which makes its application to
the incident at hand clear [to the police officer],
the potential defendant cannot be expected to con-
form his conduct to ... [that standard].
Id.
2 75 F.Supp. 620 (N.D. Ind. 1948).
meeting presents a clear and present danger to a
public interest, and (3) whether police surveil-
lance restrains or interferes with the assembly in
any manner. If a dissident group can demonstrate
all three questions answerable in its favor, relief
under the injunction provision of Section 1983
should be available. Furthermore, theoretically a
group need not wait until actual inhibitory sur-
veillance has occurred before asking for an in-
junction against such surveillance, since a group
can claim that the very threat of imminent and
probable secret surveillance, in itself, inhibits the
group's exercise of free speech, assembly and
association.P3
CONCLUSION
Insofar as the [courts are used as instrumentalities
in the administration of criminal justice, the
federal courts have an obligation to set their face
against enforcement of the law by lawless means or
means that violate rationally vindicated standards
of justice...."
In recent decisions, the judiciary has repeatedly
"set its face against enforcement of the law by
lawless means." Cases which limit the scope of
legislative inquiry, search and seizure, and wire-
tapping represent just such exercises of the judicial
conscience. Courts have permitted subordination
of the rights of free speech and association only
upon an exacted demonstration by the state of a
compelling public interest to be served by such a
restriction.
In cited cases dealing with legislative inquiry,
courts have endorsed the assertion that unre-
3 This right to speak freely and to assemble peace-
ably for any lawful purpose without interference
by either state or federal government officials or-
dinarily is thought of in connection with speaking
and assembling in a public forum. However, there
is nothing in the Constitution or in the cases de-
cided under the First Amendment which limit these
rights to such circumstances. The freedom and
liberty to express ourselves privately and to hold
private assemblies for lawful purposes and in a
lawful manner without governmental interference
or hindrance is protected as much by the First
Amendment as the right to do so publicly. Limita-
tion in this regard would be such a serious encroach-
ment upon our liberties and freedoms as to render
the pre-eminent rights guaranteed by the First
Amendment nugatory in large areas of legitimate
action.
Id. at 624.
24318 U.S. 332,341 (1943); Sherman v. United States,
356 U.S. 369, 380 (1958).
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stricted disclosure of associational privacies and
membership lists imposes a chilling effect upon
the exercise of members' First Amendment rights.
When sufficient nexus between state interest and
the investigated group is not demonstrable, cases
such as Gibsoim5 establish the immunity of asso-
ciational privacy from state interests as compelling
as the threat of Communist subversion. In cases
restricting the use of search and seizure, the courts
consistently require a showing of probable cause
to suspect criminal activity before evidence ob-
tained by means of search and seizure is admissible
in criminal proceedings. Furthermore, any search
and seizure unsupported by such probable cause
is an infringement of the Fourth Amendment
right to personal security. The safeguards of the
Bill of Rights and such recent rulings reflect the
judicial sentiment that control over the range of
investigative license is best elevated from the
level of police discretion to that of considered
judicial review.
The courts should not be willing to permit the
state to employ techniques of stealth and deception
to obtain information which it is prohibited from
obtaining by means of unrestricted wiretapping,
legislative inquiry, or search and seizure. The
state's license to secretly survey and eavesdrop
should be subject to more than only the unfettered
discretion of police officials. The courts appear to
take a position which is not only inconsistent
with the rationale behind their restriction of
other means of investigation, such as electronic
eavesdropping, but also unresponsive to the
86 372 U.S. 539 (1963).
threat which indiscriminate police surveillance of
dissident groups presents to a free society. A
system in which dissident groups must fear sur-
veillance does not encourage the free interchange
of ideas essential to a democracy.G
Statutory tools for a conscientious judicial
response to the threat of surveillance are available.
Section 1983 of Title 42 should be of particular
use, since it represents a theoretically workable
means of enjoining threatened and imminent
surveillance prior to its actual occurrence. Section
241 and Section 242 of the Civil Rights Act con-
stitute adequate framework for providing relief
to groups whose activities have already been
subjected to unprivileged surveillance.
The efficacy of statutory relief depends on the
degree of implementation which the courts grant
to the statutes involved. Judicial conscience is of
extreme importance. In the last analysis, however,
the free exercise of speech and assembly will only
be ensured when governmental agencies decide to
restrict this type of investigation to those situa-
tions clearly non-political in nature, involving a
compelling danger to community security.
8 [T]he ultimate good desired is better reached by
free trade in ideas-that the best test of truth is
the power of the thought to get itself accepted in
the competition of the market.... That, at any
rate, is the theory of our Constitution.
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919)
(Holmes & Brandeis, JJ., dissenting).
The freedom of speech and association advocated in
this article is largely private in nature. Yet the impor-
tance of this type of freedom in the dissident group
situation is significant. These private meetings often
discuss the most effective manner in which to present
the group's views to the public, and a chilling effect in
these circumstances has an ultimate effect on the public
presentation of the group's ideas.
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